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In the name of food security for the nation and poverty 
alleviation for the rural population, every developing 
country provides its farmers with irrigation water at a 
fraction of its delivery cost. However, the realization 
that fresh water is scarce and getting scarcer has forced 
a widespread rethinking of this “cheap water” policy. A 
farmer who pays next to nothing for water has no 
incentive to use it efficiently.  He uses it to grow low-
value field crops, irrigates carelessly using flood and 
furrow methods, does not repair his field channels, and 
over-waters his standing crop.  
 
It is therefore argued, in developing and developed 
countries alike, that the price of irrigation water should 
be raised to reflect its scarcity value. This policy is now 
under consideration in Morocco, China, and in parts of 
India.1 Alternatively, farmers should be allowed to sell 
their water shares to higher value uses both within and 
without the agricultural sector. Such trades would be 
economically efficient and in the farmer’s interest. 
Tradable water rights have been implemented in Chile, 
and to a lesser extent in Mexico. In short, water is an 
economic good and not a birthright, and wasteful water 
use can best be combated by “getting the prices right.” 
 
In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that in order to 
induce efficiency at the farm level, water prices should 
be raised or water trades should be facilitated. In the 
first section, I lay out the rationale for opportunity-cost 
water pricing, citing modeling, and empirical evidence 
in its favor. In Section two I bring out the (often 
implicit) assumptions under which market-like forces 
can in fact increase irrigation efficiency.  In Section 
three, drawing on a case study from the Mula Canal in 
western India, I argue that these assumptions do not 
hold on existing canal systems in many developing 
countries. Therefore, water prices (or tradable water 
rights) are not the best way to save water or increase its 
productivity. Transparent and enforceable allocation 
rules may be more feasible, and output price policy 
changes more effective, at least in the near term. 
 
OPPORTUNITY-COST PRICING: THE 
RATIONALE AND THE EVIDENCE 
 
If water prices rise to reflect its opportunity cost, a 
rational farmer should have any or all of four responses 
(Gardner, 1983). She can demand less water and leave 
some land fallow. She can cultivate all her land but 
stress her crop a little, thus maximizing her output per 
unit of water rather than her output per unit of land. She 
can diversify out of thirsty but low-value field and 
fodder crops into low-water-using but lucrative fruit 
trees and vegetables. And finally, she can invest in 
efficient irrigation technologies, such as sprinkler and 
drip systems, which allow a larger fraction of diverted 
water to be used consumptively by the plant. Even a 
simple change such as shortening the length of the 
irrigation furrow could raise field-level irrigation 
efficiencies by up to ten percent. There is evidence from 
theoretical and mathematical programming models that 
farmers do respond to price-induced water scarcity in all 
of these ways. 
 
Much of the recent literature on water prices and water 
markets is from the agriculturally rich, but water-short, 
western United States (US). Using agronomically 
derived production functions for cotton, Ayer and Hoyt 
(1981) find that farmers in Arizona reduce the water 
applied as its price rises from $0.5 per acre-foot to $5 
per acre-foot. Using Census of Agriculture data for 
several crops, Ogg and Gollehon (1989) derive 
downward sloping, albeit rather price-inelastic, demand 
functions for irrigation water. Caswell and Zilberman 
(1985) show that the probability of adopting drip 
irrigation technologies for perennial tree crops increases 
with increased water prices, amongst other factors.2 In a 
modeling exercise, Weinberg, Kling, and Wilen (1993) 
show that as water prices offered to the farmer rose 
from zero to $50 an acre-foot, water-intensive crops 
were no longer optimal, and irrigation water applied 
fell.  
 
It should be noted that in most of these studies on water 
prices, the response of water use is rather low within the 
observed price ranges. Only when the price is projected 
to rise significantly by a factor of five, ten, or 
sometimes more, is the water demand price - 
responsive.3 The consensus appears to be that the water 
demand curve for agriculture is inelastic at low water 
prices. The elasticity is high when water prices are 
already high, and when water is more a substitute for, 
than a complement to, other inputs. I shall revisit this 
point later in the paper. 
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In the developing country context, informal, intra-
watercourse trading is active on north Indian and 
Pakistani canals (Bandaragoda, 1998). Such sales are 
generally illegal, but they occur nevertheless. Short-
term sales of ground water and of water directly 
pumped from canals are quite common.  
 
Tradable water rights refer to longer-term commitments 
for an entire growing season or more. The most 
celebrated case of tradable water rights comes from 
Chile, where agrarian reforms and the Water Code of 
1981 formalized water rights, and allowed water sales 
separately from sales of land. These reforms have led to 
more land under high-valued fruits and vegetables, less 
land under pasture, and a greater than 20 percent 
increase in water use efficiency in Chilean agriculture 
(Rosegrant, Gazmuri & Yadav, 1995). The Chilean case 
has been cited as a model for other developing 
countries.4  
 
THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND “GETTING 
PRICES RIGHT” 
 
The claim that “getting prices right” is an effective 
means to irrigation efficiency is much more than a 
generic statement about downward-sloping demand 
curves. It is based on many assumptions: 
1. Water prices are significant in the overall crop 
budget, and as a fraction of crop net revenues. If 
not, the income effect of price increases may be so 
small that the water demand will barely respond.5 
2. There is a volumetric link between what a farmer 
pays and what he receives. If water is charged by 
the hectare, as it usually is in developing countries, 
its marginal cost is zero and higher prices cannot 
induce efficiency.6 
3. Farm level inefficiencies are significant in relation 
to overall system inefficiencies. If not, the farm 
level may not be the place in which to look for 
water savings. 
4. Farmers do not diversify into high-value crops and 
irrigate using wasteful methods because water is so 
cheap. If low-valued crops are grown for other 
reasons, e.g. for own consumption, or because 
farmers face labor constraints, price signals may 
not have the expected effect. 
5. The changes to the physical infrastructure that are 
necessary to implement water trades or volumetric 
pricing, such as measuring devices, channels for 
conveyance, etc., are not prohibitively expensive. If 
they are, any gains from trade will be neutralized 
by these implementation costs.7 
6. Tradable water rights can be allocated and enforced 
without high transaction costs; and third party 
effects, if significant, can be countered. If not, these 
costs and potential losses will overcome the 
benefits of trade or local water savings. 
 
The last two items relate to the difficulties of 
implementing higher water prices or tradable water 
rights, and they have borne the brunt of the criticisms 
leveled at water markets. Many reservations exist about 
the inadequate physical infrastructure of canal systems 
in developing countries, the administrative cost of 
introducing volumetric pricing (Perry, 1996), the 
difficulty of measuring water consumed rather than 
water diverted, and the possible third party effects of 
trade (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). Such 
reservations are entirely justified, but I shall focus on 
assumptions 1, 2, and 4. These assumptions do not 
relate to implementation, but rather to the effectiveness 
of price incentives per se.  
 
I examine an Indian canal system – the Mula Canal in 
Maharashtra – to ask: How effective are higher water 
prices, either imposed on or offered to the farmer, as a 
means of curtailing his water demand, even if 
transaction and infrastructure costs are not 
constraining? I analyze whether higher water charges 
are the most feasible way to induce farm level 
efficiency; whether farm level efficiency is indeed as 
dismal as it is generally thought to be; and whether 
water prices are the most relevant prices in a farmer’s 
cropping decisions.  
 
The data and modeling results I report below are from 
my own fieldwork on the Mula, carried out over eight 
months in 1991-1992. These results are more relevant 
for the analysis of water prices than of tradable water 
rights, because so little is known about how such rights 
might work in this region.  
 
FARMER INCENTIVES ON THE MULA CANAL 
 
The Mula Canal System in western India has an 
irrigable command area of 80,000 hectares. The primary 
crops are sugarcane (a thirsty, lucrative cash crop), 
sorghum, wheat, chickpeas, and groundnuts. Of late, 
sunflowers have grown in popularity. The Mula is a 
“typical” Asian canal in that the water supply is better at 
the head of the system than at the tail; water often does 
not reach the fields on time; and the farmers pay a 
(small) per hectare charge for the water they receive. 
This charge varies by the crop and the season, so there 
is some attempt to link water charges and volumes. The 
command area has several shallow wells, which 
supplement canal water supplies. The water from these 
wells is also cheap, because electricity is subsidized. 
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Water Prices and Irrigation Efficiency 
 
 
Canal water prices are heavily subsidized for the 
farmers on the Mula – so much so that water costs are 
insignificant in relation to the crops’ per acre revenues. 
For example, water costs for sunflowers are 0.77 
percent of its (average) net profits per acre; for winter 
wheat this figure is 0.59 percent; for summer 
groundnuts 1 percent; and for sugarcane 1.12 percent.  
 
All the (previously cited) evidence on price elasticities 
suggests that water demand will not respond to price 
increases when the base price of water is so low. In 
addition, the existing system of per acre water prices 
means that the marginal cost of water is zero for each 
crop. It is true that higher water fees for low-value or 
water-consuming crops might induce a farmer to switch 
over to less water-intensive crops. However, it is clear 
that prices would have to be raised by several hundred 
percent before water costs reach even 5 percent of a 
crop’s net revenues.  
 
An alternative proposal would be physically to ration 
the water given to agriculture and to each irrigated acre. 
Recall that all the ways in which a farmer could respond 
to higher water prices – fallowing land, switching crops, 
etc. – are a result of lowering her water use. Rationing 
would directly force her into a lower, and presumably 
more efficient, water use pattern. By comparing the 
farmer’s crop choices under low prices with rationing, 
and under successively higher water prices without 
rationing, we can see at what point the farm level 
irrigation demands are comparable. We can also 
estimate the net returns per unit of water applied in 
various water price and crop choice scenarios. 
 
Using cost-of-cultivation data from the upper-middle 
reaches of the Mula Canal, and a mathematical 
programming model written in GAMS, a median-sized 
farmer’s profits were computed under different water 
prices. Figure 1 plots the net profits per acre-inch of 
water applied (Y-axis) against the price of canal water 
for sugarcane (X-axis).8 Sugarcane is the crop with the 
highest water price and the highest water requirement. 
Agronomic and crop-cutting experiments show that 
sugarcane has low returns per unit of water used, but 
high returns per unit of land (Rath and Mitra, 1989). 
Therefore a water-efficient cropping pattern would have 
less sugarcane and more seasonal crops such as wheat 
or sunflowers. 
 
 
                     Figure 1. Water prices for sugarcane v. net returns to water applied 
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The model solution shows that when a farmer’s water is 
rationed according to simple, proportional allocation 
rules, a four-acre plot would have 1.4 acres of sugarcane 
(for 12 months); and a winter-summer cycle of 
sunflowers followed by groundnuts on her remaining 
land. If she can buy all the extra water she wants over 
and above that allocation, she grows four acres of 
sugarcane at a price of Rs 50/acre-inch,9 less and less 
cane as prices rise sharply, and finally replicates the 
rationing crop pattern at a price of Rs 300/acre-inch. At 
this point, the net returns to water are high and 
comparable to those under rationing. A six-fold water 
price increase was needed to induce this water-
conserving response. 
 
For the near future, such severe water price hikes are 
unlikely to be suggested, let alone implemented. 
Farmers are numerous, and they vote. They object 
vociferously even to small price increases in water or 
electricity (Economist, 1997).10 Nor would the urban 
population support significant price increases, out of 
fear that their food costs would rise, or that national 
food security would be compromised. In sum, 
significant price increases are politically infeasible, and 
feasible price increases are economically insignificant.11 
 
The net returns to water shown in Figure 1 give an 
(admittedly crude) indication of the price that farmers 
would have to be offered to sell a part of their water 
allotments. The average value of an acre-inch of water 
ranges between Rs 100 and Rs 175 (see Figure 1).12 At 
any price above its average value, the farmer could 
consider selling some water and growing a little less 
cane. In fact, the offer price would have to be even 
higher because a farmer who gives up water loses the 
insurance that this water provides in the event of a 
drought, or a sudden shortfall.13 There are no studies to 
show how much water would be demanded at these 
prices, but Rs 100 an acre-inch is already a higher rate 
than is paid by municipalities and cane-crushing 
factories within the Mula command area. 14 However, 
farmers towards the tail end of the canal may accept 
lower prices, where water supplies are already uncertain 
and only low-value crops can be supported.  
 
Main System Management and Irrigation Efficiency 
 
If water prices or water trades are expected to improve 
irrigation efficiencies, it seems reasonable to ask how 
inefficient water use at the farm level really is, and what 
the relationship is between water prices, main system 
management, and these inefficiencies.  
 
Farmers on the Mula Canal do flood irrigate their 
sugarcane fields, and they do allow water to spill 
beyond their irrigation furrows. But it is now well 
understood that these seepage and runoff “losses” are 
not necessarily lost to the basin. Wells in the command 
are recharged by seeped water, and return flows have 
instream uses or can be diverted again lower down. The 
water “saved” in one part of the system, through 
incentives or other means, may not be a net saving at all 
(Seckler, 1996). Of course, some return flows become 
saline and unusable. On the other hand, water which 
recharges a well over which the farmer has complete 
control, and which can be used between canal 
deliveries, has a very high marginal value. In the Mula 
command, well water in the parched month of May had 
a marginal value equal to 1/12 of the profits on an acre 
of groundnuts (Ray, 1997).  
 
Even if it is assumed that most of the seepage and 
runoff are irretrievably lost, a sizable fraction of these 
losses does not occur at the field level. Cumulative 
measurements of conveyance, evaporation, and other 
losses on the Mula Canal were as follows: From the 
reservoir to the distributaries, 38 percent; from these to 
the minor branches, 42 percent; from the minors to the 
field channels, 75 percent (WALMI, 1984). That is, the 
farmer can be given “incentives” to be efficient with 
only 25 percent of the irrigation water diverted from the 
reservoir. This is all the water that he has control over. 
 
 
Winter irrigation # Interval (in days) Summer irrigation # Interval (in days) 
1 Not applicable 1 Not applicable 
2 18 2 20 
3 26 3 18 
4 31 4 24 
5 27 5 34 
6 24   
 
Table 1. Irrigation delivery intervals on the Mula Canal, 1989/1990 
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These “loss” figures are for the canal overall – they 
would be lower upstream and higher downstream.15 In 
addition to lower volumes delivered, farmers along the 
bottom third of the canal have unpredictable water 
supplies. Planned and actual deliveries are further and 
further apart as they proceed down the canal, and 
farmers openly admit that they take extra water when it 
finally arrives. They are also forced into low-valued, 
water stress-tolerant field crops, because they do not 
know when next to expect water. For example, water 
from the Mula Canal is supposed to arrive at 21 day 
intervals for the winter crop season, and 14 days apart in 
the summer. The table below shows the actual delivery 
intervals for one watercourse in 1989-90. This was not 
even a tail-end watercourse. 
 
Finally, water fee collections on the Mula, as on most 
Indian canals, is poor.  The Irrigation Department’s own 
(unpublished) records show that from 1977 to 1990 
collections ranged from 15 percent of the expected 
annual total to a high of 64 percent. Had the uncollected 
balances been rolled over from year to year, these 
percentages would have been very much smaller.16 
 
To what extent farm level inefficiencies, which certainly 
exist, are themselves a response to main system 
inefficiencies is a very important question (Wade and 
Chambers, 1980). Water prices can only affect that 
water over which the farmers have some control, and 
those inefficiencies, which are caused by low water 
prices. In the present situation, higher prices (if 
collected!) are likely to lower farmers’ net revenues, but 
have only a small impact on overall water use 
efficiency.  
 
Output Prices and Irrigation Efficiency 
 
On the Mula Canal, sugarcane is the cash crop of choice 
for both large and small landholders. The cane-crushing 
mills, which are given a subsidy per ton of cane 
processed, guarantee a high support price to sugarcane 
producers. In 1991, the farm-gate price reported from 
this area was Rs 35 per quintal. (By 1996, this figure 
had risen to Rs 39). The procurement price guaranteed 
by the state of Maharashtra was Rs 29 per quintal. The 
average producer’s cost was just above Rs 22.  
 
Sugarcane is popular for its high and certain returns to 
land (the cane-crushing factories pay farmers more than 
the government support price), for its resistance to pests, 
and its low labor requirements compared to water-
efficient crops such as vegetables, oilseeds, or spices. 
The programming model of the representative farm was 
run again, this time keeping the water price low, but 
parametrically varying the price of sugarcane. The 
model solution shows that had the government not 
supported the price of cane, or subsidized the cane-
crushing facilities, it would have been unprofitable for 
the farmers to grow sugarcane (Fig. 2). When sugarcane 
prices (plotted on the X-axis) fall, the acreage of cane 
(on the primary Y-axis) drops sharply.  At cane prices 
of Rs 25 or less, even at low water prices farmers switch 
completely to a more water-conserving cycle of 
sunflowers followed by groundnuts (Ray, 1997).  
 
Figure 2. Optimal sugarcane acres and annual water use on a 4-acre farm; varying cane prices; low water 
prices 
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Maharashtra produces about 14 percent of India’s 
sugarcane (by cane weight). If the government did 
attempt to remove its support price, it would find a 
powerful, well-organized and hostile opponent in the 
cane-processing lobby (Attwood, 1985). Sugarcane 
growing farmers, too, would be up in arms. As I have 
earlier argued, drastic rises in water prices also appear 
politically impossible. But if we want to use price policy 
to reduce the demand for irrigation or to induce efficient 
crop diversification, output rather than water prices 
appear to be a more direct route. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have drawn on a case study of the Mula 
Canal in India to argue that, at this time, water price 
policy and/or a system of tradable water rights are not 
the most effective ways to increase irrigation 
efficiencies. Irrigation water prices are absurdly low 
compared with its scarcity value, and voluntary water 
trades are in principle desirable. However, it does not 
follow that raising water prices and establishing water 
markets is the natural next step for developing countries 
such as India. This is true even in the absence of 
prohibitive institutional and physical infrastructure 
costs.  
 
I have suggested that there are three broad reasons for 
this conclusion. First, water prices cannot feasibly be 
raised to the point where they can affect water demand 
and use; second, farm-level inefficiencies are not the 
most significant inefficiencies, at least on existing canal 
systems; and third, low water prices are frequently not 
the reason behind water-intensive and inefficient crop 
choices.  
 
A better first step would be to enforce simple allocation 
rules on existing canals. Enforcing these rules would 
compel many farmers to make do with less water, and 
would make its scarcity value immediately obvious. 
This step, while by no means easy, could be more 
feasible than raising prices because proportional 
allocation is already the distribution principle on 
modern Indian canals. The rules are rather loosely 
followed at present. But a concerted attempt to 
implement them would be perceived as fair, and would 
have the strong support of middle and tail end farmers 
on the canal. Physically rationed water shares and 
transparent water rights are also a prerequisite for future 
water markets. 
 
A second, and related, step is to focus the management 
efforts of Irrigation Departments in India (and 
elsewhere) on tightening the operation and maintenance 
of the main canal system. At this point, incentives for 
their staff members to operate efficiently are at least as 
urgently needed as those for farmers.  
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END NOTES 
  
                                                 
1 Water policy analysts in India are debating higher 
water prices as a way to recover the operating and 
maintenance costs of major canal systems. This is quite 
different from prices as an incentive to irrigate 
efficiently. It is quite possible to raise prices to the point 
where administrative costs are covered, and still have 
them be lower than the opportunity cost of water. 
Similarly, farm-level efficiency-inducing water trades 
can co-exist with massive subsidies at the system level. 
2 Field studies can measure only water diverted, not 
water consumed. Therefore the production functions 
used in such research could overstate or understate the 
yield response to water applied. 
3 Programming models, which are not restricted to 
observed price ranges, are more likely to yield elastic 
water – demand estimates. Including a demand function 
for the crop itself should also generate higher elasticities 
(Howitt, Watson and Adams, 1980).  
4 It should, however, be noted that both land and water 
rights in Chile were regularized over a relatively short 
period (see Bauer, 1997). It is not obvious from the 
literature to what extent the Water Code should be given 
credit for the subsequent gains in productivity.  
5 The substitution effect could be high, in which case the 
own-price demand for water could be elastic even at 
low prices.  
6 This assumption also implies that that the system 
should not physically ration the water as well as charge 
higher prices. If it does, this physical limit rather than 
the price is the relevant constraint (Perry, 1998). 
 
                                                                             
 
 
 
7 It does not matter for the analysis whether these costs 
are paid by the farmers, the government, or both. 
8 For modeling purposes, I have converted the per acre 
charges to per acre-inch equivalents. Without this 
volumetric charge assumption, the model solution 
would not respond to varying prices. Only canal water 
prices have been varied, although the farmers irrigate 
conjunctively with water from shallow dugwells.  
9 In 1992, US $1 = Rs 30 approximately. Rs 50 is 
slightly higher than the canal water price for sugarcane 
during the hot weather season (in 1991). 
10 I raised the issue of higher water prices (for cost 
recovery reasons) at the Command Area Development  
Authority for the Mula. The response of the Chief 
Engineer was brief: “Are you mad?” 
11 This situation is not unique to India. It is true of most 
agriculture-based economies. Recent work on the Gediz 
Canal in Turkey (Ray and Gdl, 1999), and the Zayandeh 
Rud Basin in Iran (Perry, 1998) had strikingly similar 
findings. 
12 Marginal values of water in agriculture vary sharply 
from month to month, or even week to week. Therefore 
this comparison is best made with average values. 
13 As an added complication, if water is sold separately 
from the land, the land could lose value. The value of 
irrigation water is frequently capitalized into the value 
of the attached land.  
14 Non-irrigation withdrawals from the Mula reservoir 
amount to 7 percent of the irrigation withdrawals. 
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15 In particular, “other” upstream losses include illegal 
water diversions, mostly for unauthorized sugarcane or 
irrigation outside the sanctioned command area. Illegal 
irrigation is not a loss, but, if it goes unchecked, it 
cannot be made efficient through higher water prices 
(Ray and Williams, 1999). 
16 In 1991, new water rates were proposed for the state 
of Maharashtra. They were somewhat higher than the 
existing rates, and the farmers on the Mula were 
unhappy with the proposal. When I mentioned this to 
the Sub-Divisional Officer with whom I worked, he was 
astonished. “Why are they angry?” he wanted to know. 
“They don’t pay us anyway.” 
